

DECLASSIFIED
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July 30, 1974

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Honorable J. Bennett Johnston
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Johnston:

As you know, the President and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a Protocol to the ABM Treaty at the Summit on July 3. This Protocol will be submitted to the US Senate for ratification. I am enclosing a copy of the Protocol and of a Fact Sheet which explains its provisions. As you can see, the newspaper article speculating on this subject which was sent to you by your constituent, Mr. Harry G. Fraser, Sr., contains a number of inaccurate statements. This Protocol will make an additional contribution to our continuing efforts to control strategic arms and will reinforce the element of strategic stability that was inherent in the original ABM Treaty of 1972.

We appreciate your expression of interest in this important subject.

Sincerely,

Linwood Holton
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Enclosure: X-

As stated

PM/DCA:Elft:jv:7/12/74

Clearances: PM/DCA - Mr. Baker ^B
PM - Mr. Sloss ^{id}
C - Mr. Terrell ^{id}
S/P - Mr. Perez ^{id}

H- ~~Mr. [unclear]~~ H.T.A.

64-1907

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
REVIEWED BY <u>[Signature]</u>	DATE <u>7/15/80</u>
PDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE	
TS AUTH. <u>[Signature]</u>	REASON(S) <u>[Signature]</u>
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PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed to limit underground nuclear weapon tests,

Have agreed as follows:

1. For the Purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the obligations of the Parties under the Treaty by national technical means, the Parties shall, on the basis of reciprocity, exchange the following data:

a. The geographic coordinates of the boundaries of each test site and of the boundaries of the geophysically distinct testing areas therein.

b. Information on the geology of the testing areas of the sites (the rock characteristics of geological formations and the basic physical properties of the rock, i. e., density, seismic velocity, water saturation, porosity and depth of water table).

c. The geographic coordinates of underground nuclear weapon tests, after they have been conducted.

d. Yield, date, time, depth and coordinates for two nuclear weapons tests for calibration purposes from each geophysically distinct testing area where underground nuclear weapon tests have been and are to be conducted. In this connection the yield of such explosions for calibration purposes should be as near as possible to the limit defined in Article I of the Treaty and not less than one-tenth of that limit. In the case of testing areas where data are not available on two tests for calibration purposes, the data pertaining to one such test shall be exchanged, if available, and the data pertaining to the second test shall be exchanged as soon as possible after a second test having a yield in the above-mentioned range. The provisions of this Protocol shall not require the Parties to conduct tests solely for calibration purposes.

2. The Parties agree that the exchange of data pursuant to subparagraphs a, b, and d of paragraph 1 shall be carried out simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, as provided in Article IV of the Treaty, having in mind that the Parties shall, on the basis of reciprocity, afford each other the opportunity to familiarize themselves with these data before the exchange of instruments of ratification.

3. Should a Party specify a new test site or testing area after the entry into force of the Treaty, the data called for by subparagraphs a and b of paragraph 1 shall be transmitted to the other Party in advance of use of that site or area. The data called for by subparagraph d of paragraph 1 shall also be transmitted in advance of use of that site or area if they are available; if they are not available, they shall be transmitted as soon as possible after they have been obtained by the transmitting Party.
4. The Parties agree that the test sites of each Party shall be located at places under its jurisdiction or control and that all nuclear weapon tests shall be conducted solely within the testing areas specified in accordance with paragraph 1.
5. For the purposes of the Treaty, all underground nuclear explosions at the specified test sites shall be considered nuclear weapon tests and shall be subject to all the provisions of the Treaty relating to nuclear weapon tests. The provisions of Article III of the Treaty apply to all underground nuclear explosions conducted outside of the specified test sites, and only to such explosions.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

The President of the
United States of America

General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JULY 3, 1974

P740078-1342

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

THE WHITE HOUSE

FACT SHEET

PROTOCOL TO THE ABM TREATY

Background

In 1972, the US and Soviet Union signed an ABM Treaty limiting each side to one ABM site for defense of their national capital and one site for the defense of an ICBM field. Each side was permitted 100 ABM interceptors as each site. The US has deployed 100 ABM interceptors around a Minuteman site at Grand Forks, North Dakota. The Soviets have deployed their ABMs around Moscow. Neither side has initiated construction of the second site permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The Agreement

- Limit each side to one ABM site for defense of their national capital (Moscow and Washington) or for defense of an ICBM field.
- Each party will have the right to dismantle its ABM system and components in the area where presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system and its components in the alternative area during the year beginning October 3, 1977 and ending October 2, 1978, and during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter.
- The Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle the ABM system center in its capital and deploy an ABM system in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, at least 1300 kilometers from Moscow.
- The US would have the right to dismantle the ABM system in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system in an area centered at its capital.
- Prior notification must be given of the desire to switch ABM defenses in accord with procedures agreed to by the SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC);